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ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT MUST ACCEPT THE ALLEGATIONS IN
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AS TRUE.
Procedurally,

this

case

is

simple

and

straight-forward.

Ronald M. Boyle, et al., (the "Plaintiffs") filed a Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment (the "Complaint") against National Union Fire
Insurance Company (the "Defendant").

The Defendant filed a Motion

to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief can be
Granted (the "Motion to Dismiss").

Thereafter, the trial court,

after oral argument, granted the Motion to Dismiss.

The trial

court filed a Statement of the Court of Grounds for Decision in
accordance with Rule 52, Ut. R. Civ. P., (the "Rule 52 Statement")
and entered the Order of Dismissal

(the "Order").

Plaintiffs

appeal from that Order.
Having successfully persuaded the trial court to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim, the Defendant now seeks to
treat the dismissal as a decision on the merits.
National Union Fire Insurance Company's Brief

In the Appellee
(the "Defendant's

Brief"), the Defendant argues that this Court does not have to
accept the allegations of the Complaint as true.

Defendant argues

that the Court should instead look to the Rule 52 Statement in
determining

\jts\boyle\appreply.pld

whether

the

trial

court

1

properly

dismissed

the

Complaint1.

This argument must fail.

The Rule 52 Statement is not

intended, nor can it be construed, to supersede the Complaint for
purposes of reviewing the Order dismissing the Complaint.

The Rule

52 Statement contains the trial court's conclusions based upon its
understanding of the facts alleged in the Complaint and elsewhere.
However, because the Defendant had filed a motion to dismiss, the
trial court was required to accept the allegations of the Complaint
as true.

Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Ut.

1990) . Moreover, because no evidence, in the form of affidavits or
otherwise, was presented to the trial court, the trial court could
look

only

to

determination.

allegations

of

the

Complaint

in

making

its

All other information, including the arguments of

counsel and counsel's recitation of "facts," was irrelevant and
could not serve as a factual basis for the trial court's decision.2
The only "facts" that the trial court was entitled to consider, and

1

The cases cited by Defendant, Reed v. Anderson, 211 P. 2d 206
(Utah 1949); Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951) and Backman
v. Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah 1962) do not support the
argument that this Court should not accept the allegations of
Plaintiff's Complaint as true. Instead, each of those cases only
stands for the proposition that, if the complaint fails to allege
facts which would support a cause of action, then the complaint
should be dismissed. None of the cases state that the court should
not be constrained to accept the allegations of the complaint as
true.
2

Defendant also quotes extensively from the transcript of the
hearing on the Motion to Dismiss in an effort to interject material
that is entirely irrelevant to this Court's decision. Defendant's
efforts to introduce this material are nothing more than an attempt
to cloud the issues before this Court.
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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the only "facts" before this Court, are the allegations of the
Complaint.
II.
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS DE NOVO.
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the
Complaint

did not

state a claim for declaratory

relief.

The

"standard of review for the trial court's disposition of legal
questions, whether from a partial summary judgment or declaratory
judgment, is a correction of error standard, giving no deference to
the trial court's ruling."

Camp v. Office of Recovery Services,

779 P.2d 242, 244 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
standard is de novo

Accordingly, the proper

review of the trial court's decision.

Defendant contends that because the trial court is empowered
with the discretion to refuse to render a declaratory judgment the
appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion, not de
review.

The Defendant's position is incorrect.

novo

"Courts have

discretion to decide whether they will exercise jurisdiction under
the

declaratory

judgment

act.

Although

this

decision

is

discretionary, our standard of review is more stringent than the
'abuse of discretion' standard; we may substitute our judgment for
the lower court's."

Century Indemnity Co. v McGillacuty's, Inc.,

820 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir. 1987).
court's

decision

conclusion.
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granting

In the present case, the trial

the Motion

to

Dismiss

This Court should review the matter de

3

was
novo.

a

legal

III.
PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION.
Defendant

argues

that

a

"simple

review of Terracor.

evidences that Plaintiffs have not met the required elements of the
doctrine of standing. . .."

(Defendant's Brief at 45). Defendant

then cites five "required elements" for standing.

The decision in

Terracor, however, does not establish five required elements for
standing.

Instead, Terracor identifies three alternative grounds,

only one of which must be satisfied for a party to have standing.
The grounds are alternative, not conjunctive. Terracor v. Utah Bd.
of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796,799 (Utah 1986).
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, under the

first

alternative, a plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered
some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake
in the outcome of the legal dispute.

If a plaintiff does not have

standing under the first alternative, he will have standing under
the second alternative if no one else has a greater interest in the
outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all
unless that particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issues.
The third alternative is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Plaintiffs have standing under the first two alternatives.
First, each of the Plaintiffs has suffered a monetary loss.

The

only possible avenue of recovery, by court order, is to the extent
insurance proceeds cover the claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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suffered an injury that gives them a personal stake in the outcome
of this action and, as a result, the first alternative basis for
standing is satisfied.
There is an even more compelling argument for standing under
the second alternative.

The insureds in the underlying tort action

have all received discharges in bankruptcy. Under no circumstances
will the insureds have any liability to the Plaintiffs.

The

insureds have no stake in the outcome of the underlying action and,
as a result, the

insureds

could not

care

less about

insurance coverage exists or does not exist.
the declaratory

judgment

The issues raised by

action will not be raised at all if

Plaintiffs are not permitted
judgment action.

whether

to proceed with this declaratory

In this case, Plaintiffs are the only persons

with an interest in resolving the insurance issues raised in the
Complaint and, as a result, are effectively the only persons with
standing.
A.
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-201 (1991) does not Divest
Plaintiffs of Standing or Limit Plaintiffs' Right to Bring a
Declaratory Judgment Action Against the Defendant.
Defendant
implicitly
before

a

argues

requires
party

can

that

that

Utah

Code

Ann.

an unsatisfied

maintain

an

action

§31A-22-201

judgment
against

be
an

(1991)

presented
insurer.

Defendant asserts that because Plaintiffs do not have a judgment
against the insureds, Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a
declaratory

\jts\boyle\appreply pld

judgment

action

against

5

Defendant.

Defendant's

argument is incorrect.

Section 31A-22-201, which only governs the

required contents of an insurance policy, provides that:
Every liability insurance policy shall provide
that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the
insured may not diminish any liability of the
insured
to third parties, and that if
execution against the insured is returned
unsatisfied, an action may be maintained
against the insurer to the extent of the
liabilities covered by the policy.
The

statute

insurance

provides

policies

a

that

all

insurers

provision

insolvency of the insured.

must

regarding

include

the

in

bankruptcy

the
or

The section also requires that insurers

include in their policies a provision that allows injured parties
to commence a direct action for money damages against the insurer
after a judgment has been obtained and returned unsatisfied. The
provision is intended to protect injured parties.

The provision

does not limit or eliminate an injured person's right to seek
declaratory relief. There is absolutely no case law or legislative
history indicating that this provision was intended to limit a
party's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action against an
insurer.

If the Utah Legislature had intended to preclude any

action against an insurer prior to the entry of a judgment against
the insureds, the legislature could have enacted such a statute.3

3

In fact, some states do have such a statute. Many of the
cases that Defendant relies on in its efforts to dismiss the
Complaint come out of the state of Maine. The Maine courts reached
these decisions because the legislature had enacted 24-A M.R.S.A.
§2904 which provides that:
\jts\boyle\appreply pld

6

Even if this Court concludes that §31A-22-201 limits injured
persons rights to bring actions against an insurer, the limitation
does not apply to the present case.

The statute's reference to an

"execution against the insured that is returned unsatisfied" is a
reference to a money judgment.

In this case, the Complaint seeks

only declaratory relief, not monetary relief.

Accordingly, this

statute, even if read as Defendant urges, does not preclude the
Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment action.

As a result, the statute

does not eliminate the Plaintiffs' standing.
B. Contractual Limitations on the Ability to Bring Suit do
not Apply to Plaintiffs.
Defendant
insurance
standing

argues

policies
to

bring

that

and
this

that

Plaintiffs
as

action.

are not

a result,
Defendant

parties

Plaintiffs
also

to

the

have

no

argues

that

Plaintiffs cannot bring this declaratory judgment action because
the insurance policies specifically preclude direct actions against
the Defendant until any claim against the insureds has been reduced
to a judgment.

These two positions are entirely contradictory and

insupportable.

It is disingenuous of the Defendant to contend that

Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment
action because they are not parties to the insurance policies, and
at the same time argue that the terms of the insurance policies
No civil action shall be brought against an
insurer to reach and apply such insurance
money until 2 0 days have elapsed from the time
of the rendition of the final judgment against
the judgment debtors.
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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should be binding upon Plaintiffs.
ways.

Defendant cannot have it both

If Plaintiffs are not parties to the insurance policies,

which they are not, then the terms of the insurance policies are
not binding upon them.
C.
The Plaintiff's Declaratory Judgment Action is Not a
Prohibited Direct Action.
Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs have no standing to
bring this action because, "it has long been the rule in Utah that
a third party cannot bring a direct action against an alleged
tortfeasors insurer. . . . "4

(Defendant's Brief at 21). Defendant,

however, has failed to provide any statutory or case law supporting
the argument that a separate declaratory judgment action against an
insurer is a "direct action."

To the contrary, it is well settled

that a separate declaratory judgment action against an insurer is
not a prohibited direct action.

Reagor v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 450

N.E.2d 512, 515 (111. App. 1980).

Thus, even assuming that Utah

law does prohibit direct actions against insurers, the declaratory
judgment

is

not

a

prohibited

direct

action

and,

therefore,

Plaintiffs have standing to bring the action.

4

A declaratory judgment action against an insurer is allowed
in Utah because it is not a prohibited direct action. As set forth
in the Brief of Appellant, in Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646
P. 2d 73 7 (Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a third
party could bring a declaratory judgment action against an insurer
unless the insurer could show that prejudice would result from the
declaratory action.
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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D.
None of the Cases Cited by Defendant Preclude
Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Action Against Defendant.

the

The Defendant argues that the better reasoned view outside
this

jurisdiction

holds

that

Plaintiffs,

as

strangers

to

the

insurance policies, have no standing to bring a declaratory action
against Defendant.

(Defendant's Brief at 30). The cases cited by

Defendant, however, are all legally and factually distinguishable
from the case at bar and, therefore, do not compel the conclusion
asserted by Defendant.

See e.g., Cross v. Occidental Fire and

Casualty Co., 347 F.Supp. 342 (W. D. Okla. 1972) (Suit to compel
payment, not to determine validity of contract after Defendant
expressly

alleged

that

the

contract

was

void);

American

Home

Assurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 475 F.Supp. 1169 (E.D.
Pa.

1979)

(Court declined

to grant declaratory relief

because

action was between two insurers seeking a declaration regarding
excess insurance while the two insurers did not have adverse legal
interests) ; St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective
Co. , 675 S.W.2d 665
grant

declaratory

(Mo. Ct. App. 1984)

relief

because

the

(The Court declined to

action

was

between

two

insurers who did not yet have adverse interests) / Smith v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 483 A.2d 344 (Maine 1984) (Plaintiff, an injured party,
sought a declaration that the insurer had an obligation to provide
counsel for the insured and the court concluded that the plaintiff
had no interest in whether the insurer provided the defense or the
insured chose independent counsel); Anderson v. St. Paul Fire and
\jts\boyle\appreply.pld
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Marine

Ins. Co. , 414 N.W.2d

575

(Minn. Ct. App. 1987)

(Court

refused to grant declaratory relief because the plaintiff sought to
establish the liability of the insurer); Belafonte Reinsurance Co.
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 590 F.2d 187 (S.D. N.Y. 1984)
(The court concluded that there was no controversy between two
insurers

seeking

a determination

regarding

excess

insurance);

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Federated Mutual Implement and Hardware Ins.
Co.,

254

F.Supp.

629

(S.C.

1966)

(Court

declined

to

grant

declaratory relief because it was an action between two insurers
seeking

a determination

Pomroy, 277 A. 2d 727

regarding

excess

(Maine 1971)

insurance); Allen v.

(The court declined to grant

declaratory relief because (1) the injured party sought to maintain
a civil action directly against the insurer seeking damages for
injuries and (2) Maine has a statute expressly prohibiting civil
actions against an insurer until twenty days after the rendition of
a final judgment); Associated Hospital Service of Maine v. Maine
Bonding and Casualty Co., 476 A.2d 189

(Maine 1984)

concluded that the action, which was not

(The court

a declaratory judgment

action, was precluded by Maine's statute requiring waiting twenty
days after obtaining a judgment to bring an action against an
insurer); Newton v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 371 S.E.2d 782 (N.C.
Ct.

App.

1988)

contingent

upon

(The

plaintiff

future

sought

a

or hypothetical

Providence Washington Ins., 759 P. 2d 523
involve

a

\jts\boyle\appreply pld

declaratory

judgment
10

action

declaratory

events)/
(Alaska)
but

OK

judgment
Lumber

v.

(Case did not

rather

the

court

addressed the question of whether the duty of good faith and fair
dealing

extended

to

third

parties

to

an

insurance

contract) ;

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 286 F.2d
91

(3rd

Cir.

1961)

(Declaratory

judgment

action

between

two

insurers regarding excess insurance); Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1964)

(Court

would not permit a declaratory judgment action between two insurers
because there was no actual controversy -- the court recognized
that there could be an actual controversy between the insurer and
an injured party); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kellas, 173 F.2d 120 (1st
Cir. 1949) (Court concluded that there was no actual controversy
because (1) all parties agreed on the proper interpretations of the
provisions

for coverage,

(2) it was

conceded

that, under

the

allegations of the complaint, the liabilities asserted against the
tortfeasors were the type covered by the insurance policies and (3)
the

insurer

recognized

its

duty

to

defend

the

tort

action);

American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania Thresherman and
Farmers Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453

(5th Cir. 1960)

(Declaratory judgment action between two insurers regarding excess
insurance); Gray v. New Mexico Military Institute, 249 F.2d 28
(10th Cir. 1957) (Plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant
and its employees were negligent) ; Roberts v. Farmers Ins. Co., 53 3
P.2d 158 (Nevada 1975) (Court would not allow declaratory judgment
action against an insurer because the insurer agreed to pay any
judgment obtained against the insured); White v. Goodville Mutual
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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Casualty Co., 596 P.2d 1229 (Kansas 1979) (Plaintiff filed a direct
action

against

the

insurer

seeking

monetary

damages

because

plaintiff had been unable to serve a copy of the complaint on the
insured); Zaborac v. American Casualty Co. of Reading Pennsylvania,
663 F.Supp. 330

(CD. 111. 1987)

(The court denied declaratory

relief because the case involved an indemnity policy rather than
liability policy and the court concluded that the insurer had no
obligation until the end of the underlying tort action); Century
Indemnity Co. v. McGillacuty/ s, Inc., 820 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1987)
(Dispute between two insurers regarding excess insurance).
None of the above cited cases involve relevant facts similar
to the case at bar.

Thus, contrary to the Defendant's assertion,

other jurisdictions would not preclude Plaintiff's action against
the Defendant. Under the standards established by the Utah Supreme
Court in Terracor, Supra., Plaintiffs have standing to bring this
declaratory judgment action.
IV.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT WILL TERMINATE
UNCERTAINTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE EXISTENCE
OF COVERAGE AND THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE.
The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the basis that the
declaratory judgment action would not answer all of the questions
raised.

In rendering this conclusion, the trial court focused on

the potential uncertainties in the underlying tort action
"Tort Action").

The uncertainties regarding

however, have no bearing on the Complaint.
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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(the

the Tort Action,

The

Plaintiffs

are

seeking

a

declaration

that

(1)

the

Insurance Policies are valid, enforceable contracts and (2) that
the claims alleged in the Tort Action are insured risks. The trial
court

failed

Likewise,

in

to

distinguish

between

the

Defendant's

Brief,

the
the

two

declarations.

Defendant

fails

distinguish between the declarations sought by Plaintiffs.

to

To the

extent the Defendant recognizes that Plaintiffs are seeking two
declarations, Defendant argues that, "since Plaintiffs essentially
argue for the first time on appeal that the trial court failed to
distinguish between the two declarations sought, this Court should
refuse to consider such claims raised for the first time now or
abandoned below without any attempt by Plaintiffs to modify the
trial court's factual findings in such respect."
Brief at pg. 47.)

(Defendant's

This statement is without merit.

In paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, "as
persons interested under the Insurance Policies, Plaintiffs are
entitled to a determination that the Insurance Policies are valid
and

enforceable

contracts,

and

are

further

entitled

to

a

determination that the claims asserted in the Complaint are insured
risks under the terms of the Insurance Policies."

Furthermore, in

the Rule 52 Statement, the document upon which Defendant places
such great emphasis, the Court stated that, "this is a case where
Plaintiffs have filed a Complaint for declaratory relief requesting
that the Court determine
enforceability
\jts\boyle\appreply pld

of

an

the scope of coverage under and the

insurance
13

policy

or

policies

.

.

.."

Accordingly, the different declarations sought were clearly before
the trial court. Defendant's efforts to blur this distinction must
not be permitted.
As set forth above, Plaintiffs seek two declarations in this
action.

Plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that the Insurance

Policies

are

valid

and

enforceable

contracts.

Assuming

the

Insurance Policies are valid and enforceable, Plaintiffs are then
seeking a declaration that the claims asserted in the Tort Action
are insured risks under the terms of the Insurance Policies.
As to the first issue, Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint that
Defendant

has

denied

liability

on

the

grounds

that

(1)

the

Insurance Policies are void or voidable due to misrepresentations
made by the insureds in the respective applications and (2) that
two of the Insurance Policies expired prior to the time that claims
were made against
independent

from

the policy.
the

Tort

These two issues are

Action.

Furthermore,

entirely

whether

the

Insurance Policies are valid is not contingent on the happening of
another event. The existence of insurance is a condition precedent
to any recovery by the Plaintiffs.
Insurance

Policies

are

terminate uncertainty.

valid

and

A determination
enforceable

that

contracts

the
will

If they are valid, the Plaintiffs will

prosecute the Tort Action.

If the Insurance Policies are void,

then Plaintiffs will not prosecute the Tort Action.
Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the claims alleged in
the Tort Action are insured risks under the Insurance Policies.
\jts\boyle\appreply pld
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This requested determination does not require the resolution of a
hypothetical set of facts.

Instead, it simply requests that the

Court determine whether the facts alleged in the underlying Tort
Action give rise to coverage under the Insurance Policies.

If the

claims are not the type covered by the Insurance Policies, then the
Tort Action will not be prosecuted.
Plaintiffs have filed the declaratory judgment action only
because

Defendant

denied

liability.

Defendant

argues

that,

"Plaintiffs are improperly seeking declaratory relief so that they
can essentially determine if it is worth their trouble to proceed
against the insureds."
efforts

are

condition

not

(Defendant's Brief at 23) . The Plaintiffs'

improper.

precedent

to

any

The

existence

recovery.

of

insurance

Defendant

has

is a
denied

liability under the Insurance Policies, alleging that the same are
void or voidable.

The Defendant, by its own action, has given rise

to the present controversy.

It is disingenuous for Defendant to

now say that Plaintiffs are not entitled to declaratory relief to
resolve

the

issues

created

by

the

raised by the Defendant.

Defendant

should

judgment.

\jts\boyle\appreply pld

15

be

resolved

The

controversy

by

declaratory

V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs respectfully request
that

this

Court

reverse

the

trial

court's

dismissal

of

the

Complaint.5
Respectfully submitted this /j£

day of November, 1992.

HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
By Gary N^^-AQderson, Esq.
and
SNELL

an, Esq.
ivertsen, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

5

Footnote 4 of the Brief of Appellants states that, " [a] true
and correct copy of the Fourth Amended Complaint is attached hereto
as Addendum 4." The Plaintiffs, however, decided not to attach a
copy of the Fourth Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs inadvertently
failed to delete footnote 4.
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